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Abstract
We study the measurement of well-being when individuals have hetero-
geneous preferences, including diﬀerent conceptions of a life worth living.
When individuals diﬀer in the conception of a life worth living, the equiv-
alent income can regard an individual whose life is not worth living as
being better oﬀ than an individual whose life is worth living. In order
to avoid that paradoxical result, we reexamine the ethical foundations of
well-being measures in such a way as to take into account heterogeneity
in the conception of a life worth living. We derive, from simple axioms,
an alternative measure of well-being, which is an equivalent income net of
the income threshold making lifetime neutral. That new well-being index
always ranks an individual whose life is not worth living as worse-oﬀ than
an individual with a life worth living.
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Introduction
In the recent years, the equivalent income has become an increasingly used
indicator of well-being, with various applications for well-being measurement
and comparisons within and between countries.1 Deﬁned as the hypothetical
income which, combined with references on non-monetary dimensions of life,
would make an individual indiﬀerent with respect to his current situation, the
equivalent income constitutes a preference-based indicator of well-being that is
inclusive of (potentially) all non-monetary dimensions of well-being (see Fleur-
baey and Blanchet 2013, Fleurbaey 2016). Its speciﬁcity is to allow for the
weighting of the diﬀerent dimensions of life, while being respectful of how indi-
viduals evaluate the diﬀerent dimensions of their life.
Early uses of the equivalent income approach, such as Usher (1973, 1980),
focused on a simple (income, lifetime) space. Given that lifetime is a central
dimension of human well-being (Sen 1998), it does not come as a surprise that
many studies using the equivalent income approach have focused on the (income,
lifetime) space, or on the (income, life expectancy) space. Such studies include,
in a historical context, Williamson (1984), Crafts (1997) and Costa and Steckel
(1997), as well as Nordhaus (2003) and Becker et al (2005).
In order to compute equivalent incomes based on real-world data, most ex-
isting studies assume some structure for individual preferences in the (income,
lifetime) space. The postulated functional form for individual utility represents
not only how a representative individual weights life-years against income, but,
also, deﬁnes a threshold level for income below which life is not worth living,
and above which life is worth living (see Becker et al 2005). More precisely,
those studies deﬁne a critical income level, above which lifetime is a desirable
good, and below which lifetime is an undesirable good.2
Assuming the existence of a critical income level making lifetime neutral
makes a lot of sense. If such a critical income level did not exist, then it would
be the case either that any life, whatever living conditions are (even extremely
miserable conditions), would be worth living, or, alternatively, that any life,
whatever standards of living are (even excellent living conditions), would be not
worth living. Such a corollary is implausible. Hence it makes sense to assume
that there exists a critical income level making lifetime neutral, and which
deﬁnes income intervals where more life-years is either desirable, or undesirable.
Whereas assuming a critical income level making lifetime neutral is justi-
ﬁed, the existing literature on equivalent income did not, so far, examine all
corollaries of that particular assumption for the measurement of well-being. A
particularly interesting implication concerns the comparison of well-being be-
tween individuals who have unequal critical income levels, and, thus, who do not
share the same conception of a life worth living. It is actually possible that the
equivalent income associated to the life of a person who regards his life as not
1Recent applications include Decoster and Haan (2015), Carpentier and Sapata (2016),
Decancq and Neumann (2016), Ponthiere (2016), Decancq et al (2017) and Onder et al (2018).
2The concept of critical income making lifetime neutral is the equivalent, in income terms,
of Broome's concept of a utility level neutral for the continuation of existence (Broome 2004).
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Figure 1: A paradox for the equivalent income.
worth living can exceed the equivalent income associated to the life of another
person, who regards his life as worth living. That anomaly, ﬁrst identiﬁed in
Onder et al (2018), is illustrated on Figure 1.
Individuals i and j have distinct preferences, represented, on Figure 1, by
distinct indiﬀerence maps in the (income, lifetime) space. In particular, those
two individuals have diﬀerent critical income levels y˜i making lifetime neutral,
and thus at which a vertical indiﬀerence line is deﬁned. Individual i beneﬁts from
lower living standards than individual j, but he regards his life as worth living.
On the contrary, individual j considers that his life is not worth living. Indeed,
although individual j beneﬁts from better living conditions, his conception of a
life worth living is more demanding, and at the bundle represented on Figure 1,
individual j considers his life not worth living. Figure 1 shows also the equivalent
income (computed while deﬁning the maximal lifetime as the reference lifetime)
takes a higher level for individual j than for individual i, despite the fact that
the former regards his life as not worth living, whereas the latter regards his life
as worth living. Thus the equivalent income considers that the individual whose
life is not worth living is better oﬀ than the one whose life is worth living.
That result is somewhat paradoxical. Regarding his life as worth living
or not is deﬁnitely a central component of individual preferences. Hence, it is
paradoxical that a preference-based indicator of well-being such as the equivalent
income regards a person whose life is not worth living as strictly better oﬀ than
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a person whose life is worth living. Of course, this paradox does not arise when
individuals share the same conception of a life worth living. But there is no
reason to assume a priori that all individuals share the same conception of a
life worth living. If there exist as many preferences as there are individuals, for
sure this aspect of life valuation is not uniform across all individuals.
Hence, in the light of that paradoxical result, one may want to reexamine the
construction of equivalent income well-being indexes in the context of distinct
conceptions of a life worth living. Note that, when facing that problem, one
may simply argue that the person with a more demanding conception of a life
worth living exhibits some form of expensive tastes, and that a well-being
measure should not be sensitive to such expensive tastes. But that response,
too, invites a revision of the well-being measure that is used in the present
context of unequal conceptions of life worth living.
The goal of this paper is precisely to reexamine the construction of a measure
of well-being when individuals diﬀer regarding their conception of a life worth
living. For that purpose, we consider a model of the human life cycle, where
individuals diﬀer in preferences on bundles in the (income, lifetime) space, in
particular concerning the deﬁnition of a life worth living. Then, we propose to
build a well-being index on the basis of several intuitive properties.
Anticipating our results, we ﬁrst show that the Pareto Principle, the Con-
ditional Priority axiom and the Translation axiom suﬃce to fully characterize
a new measure of well-being, which is the equivalent income index net of the
critical income making lifetime neutral. That new well-being measure is, by
construction, immunized against the paradoxical result highlighted at the very
outset of this paper. Two new axioms are used for his characterization. On the
one hand, Conditional Priority concerns interpersonal well-being comparisons
under a shared conception of the life worth living. That axiom states condi-
tions on bundles under which the fact of carrying more about longevity than
about income makes a person either better oﬀ or worse oﬀ than another person
sharing the same bundle but having diﬀerent preferences. On the other hand,
the Translation axiom concerns interpersonal well-being comparisons when in-
dividuals diﬀer in their conception of a life worth living, their indiﬀerence maps
being translations from each other. That axiom states that, when measuring
well-being, what matters is the distance between the bundle under comparison
and the vertical indiﬀerence line deﬁned at the critical income level character-
izing a neutral life. In a second stage, we characterize an alternative equivalent
income index, also net of the critical income making lifetime neutral, but rely-
ing on diﬀerent reference lifetime levels. That alternative well-being index relies
on a variant of the Conditional Priority axiom, which regards individuals more
concerned with longevity as always worse oﬀ than individuals less concerned
with longevity, contrary to the initial Conditional Priority axiom.
This paper is related to several branches of the literature. First, it is re-
lated to the general literature on the measurement of well-being (see Adler and
Fleurbaey 2016). In particular, it is related to the increasingly large literature
on the construction of equivalent incomes (see Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013,
Decancq and Neumann 2016, Decancq and Schokkaert 2016, Onder et al 2018).
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Second, given that the construction of well-being indexes is often a ﬁrst stage
in the design of optimal policies under heterogeneous preferences, this paper is
also related to the normative literature on the fair allocation of resources under
unequal lifetime, such as Fleurbaey and Ponthiere (2013) and Fleurbaey et al
(2014). Those papers relied on consumption equivalents under heterogeneous
preferences, and may be subject to the paradoxical result discussed at the very
outset of this paper.
This paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
Section 3 presents the axioms. The characterization of the equivalent income net
of the critical income making lifetime neutral is developed in Section 4. Section
5 examines the characterization of an alternative well-being index, based on a
variant of the Conditional Priority axiom. Section 6 concludes.
The model
The population is a set N of individuals i, j, ... Given that we want to examine
interpersonal well-being comparisons, we assume that the number of individuals
in N is at least two.
Each individual life is characterized by a (constant) income per period yi ∈
R+and a lifetime Li ∈
[
0, L
]
.
Each individual i has well-deﬁned preferences i on bundles (y, L) that are
composed of (constant) income per period y and of lifetime L. Let R denote
the set of preferences that are monotonic in income and convex.
As usual, the preference relation i is assumed to be complete, reﬂexive and
transitive. Strict preference is denoted by ≺i, while indiﬀerence is denoted by
∼i.
An indiﬀerence curve passing through the basket is deﬁned as follows:
IC (y, L,i) = {(y′, L′) : (y′, L′) ∼i (y, L)} .
We say that IC (y, L,i) is steeper than IC (y, L,j) if for all (y′, L′) ∈ IC (y, L,i) ,
one has (y′, L′) j (y, L) if L′ > L and (y′, L′) ≺j (y, L) if L′ < L. Note that
this implies single-crossing of the two curves: IC (y, L,i) ∩ IC (y, L, ,j) =
{(y, L)} .
For each individual i, the indiﬀerence map IM(i) is deﬁned as the set of all
indiﬀerence curves IC (y, L,i). The indiﬀerence maps IM (i) is a translation
of IM (j) whenever there is z ∈ R+ such that for all (y, L) , (y′, L′) , one has
(y, L) i (y′, L′) if and only if (y + z, L) j (y′ + z, L′).
For an individual i, we deﬁne the lower contour set at the bundle (y, L) as:
L(y, L,i) = {(y′, L′) : (y, L) i (y′, L′)}
For an individual i, we deﬁne the upper contour set at the bundle (y, L) as:
U(y, L,i) = {(y′, L′) : (y, L) i (y′, L′)}
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For each individual i, there exists a critical income level y˜i > 0 such that
for all bundles with y > y˜i, lifetime is a desirable good, whereas for all bundles
with y = y˜i, lifetime is a neutral good, whereas for all bundles with y < y˜i,
lifetime is an undesirable good. Observe that the subset {(y, L) : y = y˜i} is an
indiﬀerence curve for every i.
The critical income level y˜i > 0 captures the idea of a life worth living. If
such a critical income level did not exist, then either all lives would not be
worth living (lifetime being always an undesirable good), or all lives would be
worth living (lifetime being always a desirable good). Those two possibilities
are implausible. Clearly, when living conditions are excellent, it is hard to
see why a life would not be worth living. Moreover, when living conditions are
extremely miserable, it is hard to see why a life would necessarily be worth living.
Thus, it makes sense to assume that there exists a particular critical income
level, which captures a critical quality of life, below which lifetime becomes an
undesirable good, whereas above that threshold, lifetime is a desirable good.
That assumption is largely made in the literature (see, for instance, Becker et al
2005). One can also interpret the critical income level making lifetime neutral
as the equivalent, in terms of income, of Broome's concept of the utility level
neutral for the continuation of existence (see Broome 2004).
In the rest of the paper, we want to construct a measure of individual well-
being. Such a measure, denoted by M(y, L,i), assigns a real number to all
bundles (y, L) in such a way as to describe those bundles from the perspective
of well-being. We thus have: M(y, L,i) : R+×
[
0, L
]×R → R. That measure
is deﬁned for all bundles, and for all individuals (actually, for all possible pref-
erences in the domain R), and allows for the comparison of well-being across
individuals with potentially diﬀerent bundles and diﬀerent preferences.
Axioms
This section presents some properties that we will impose on the well-being
measure M(y, L,i).
Pareto Principle ∀i ∈ N , if (y, L) ∼i (y′, L′) thenM (y, L,i) =M (y′, L′,i),
and if (y, L) i (y′, L′) then M (y, L,i) > M (y′, L′,i).
The Pareto Principle is standard: it merely states that a measure of well-being
should respect individual preferences. It states that if one considers bundles that
lie on the same indiﬀerence curve as the bundle (yi, Li), then the measured well-
being should remain the same for all those bundles between which individual
i is indiﬀerent. However, if a bundle lies on a higher indiﬀerence curve, this
should be assigned a higher level of well-being.
The next axiom, Conditional Priority, speciﬁes some requirements that the
measure M(y, L,i) should satisfy when considering interpersonal comparisons
of well-being for individuals who enjoy the same bundle but have diﬀerent pref-
erences (except the critical income level making lifetime neutral, which is here
assumed to be the same for all individuals under comparison).
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Conditional Priority ∀i, j ∈ N , with y˜i = y˜j = y˜, ∃L1, L2 > 0 such
that:
• if Li = Lj = L ≤ L1 and if yi = yj = y < y˜, then if IC(y, L,i) is steeper
than IC(y, L,j) at (y, L), then M(y, L,i) ≤M(y, L,j).
• if Li = Lj = L ≥ L1 and if yi = yj = y < y˜, then if IC(y, L,i) is steeper
than IC(y, L,j) at (y, L), then M(y, L,i) ≥M(y, L,j).
• if Li = Lj = L ≤ L2 and if yi = yj = y > y˜, then if IC(y, L,i) is steeper
than IC(y, L,j) at (y, L), then M(y, L,i) ≥M(y, L,j).
• if Li = Lj = L ≥ L2 and if yi = yj = y > y˜, then if IC(y, L, ,i) is
steeper than IC(y, L,j) at (y, L), then M(y, L,i) ≤M(y, L,j).
Conditional Priority states that, when comparing individuals enjoying the same
bundle but having diﬀerent preferences (except the critical income level making
lifetime neutral), whether social priority should be given to individuals who are
more concerned with income or with lifetime depends on whether their life is
worth living (and thus on whether income is above or below some critical level),
and on whether lifetime is above or below some critical threshold.
More precisely, when we consider individuals enjoying the same bundle, but
whose lives are not worth living, there exists a threshold for lifetime above
which the individual who cares more about lifetime is regarded as the worst-oﬀ,
and below which the individual who cares more about consumption is regarded
as the worst-oﬀ. On the contrary, when lives are worth living, there exists
another threshold for lifetime above which the individual who cares more about
consumption is regarded as the worst-oﬀ, and below which the individual who
cares more about lifetime is regarded as the worst-oﬀ.
The two lifetime thresholds L1 and L2 are ethical parameters that have a
clear meaning. When considering lives not worth living, one can acknowledge
that, when the life is suﬃciently short, the worst-oﬀ individual is the one who
cares more about income, and less about lifetime, whereas the opposite holds
when the life not worth living is too long. The ethical parameter L1 acts as a
threshold separating what is regarded as a life not worth living that is suﬃ-
ciently short (so that social priority goes to the individual with more concern
for income), or deﬁnitely too long (so that social priority goes to the individual
with more concern for lifetime). In a similar way, the threshold L2 separates,
on the one hand, a life worth living that is insuﬃciently long, and which leads
thus to give priority to individuals who care more about lifetime, and, on the
other hand, a life worth living that is suﬃciently long, so that social priority
must be given to individuals who care more about income.3
Figure 2 illustrates the requirements of Conditional Priority in terms of well-
being comparisons. Figure 2 shows the four areas of the (income, lifetime) space
3Obviously those two lifetime thresholds are ethical parameters, whose levels reﬂect value
judgments. One could think, for instance, about levels such as 30 years and 70 years. 30 years
would be the threshold below which lives not worth living are suﬃciently short, whereas 70
years would be the threshold above which lives worth living are suﬃciently long.
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Figure 2: Conditional Priority
that are deﬁned in the Conditional Priority axiom. Those areas are delimited by
the critical income making lifetime neutral, as well as by the two thresholds for
lifetime L1 and L2. The little arrow indicates the individual who is considered
to have social priority under Conditional Priority.
Let us now consider a third axiom, the Translation axiom, which concerns
the comparison of well-being between individuals who diﬀer regarding the crit-
ical income level making lifetime neutral, but share all other dimensions of the
indiﬀerence map. In other words, the Translation axiom concerns interpersonal
well-being comparisons of individuals sharing the same indiﬀerence map up to
a translation.
Translation ∀i, j ∈ N such that IM(i) is a translation of IM(j), with
y˜j = y˜i + x with x > 0, if Li = Lj and if yi − y˜i = yj − y˜j , then
M(yi, Li,i) =M(yj , Lj ,j).
The Translation axiom states that, when the indiﬀerence map of an individ-
ual is a translation of the indiﬀerence map of another individual, then if their
bundles exhibit the same lifetime and lie at the same distance of their individual-
speciﬁc critical income levels making lifetime neutral, then those individuals are
regarded as exactly as well-oﬀ as each other. The Translation axioms states
that, when measuring well-being of individuals whose indiﬀerence maps are mere
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Figure 3: Translation axiom
translations, what matters is the distance to the vertical indiﬀerence line asso-
ciated to the critical income level. Having a larger income does not give any
advantage to an individual if the diﬀerential with respect to the critical income
making lifetime neutral remains the same.
Figure 3 illustrates the Translation axiom in a simple two-person case. The
indiﬀerence map of individual j is a mere translation of the indiﬀerence map of
individual i. Since the bundles of individuals i and j involve the same lifetime
and are equi-distant with respect to their critical income making lifetime neutral
(respectively y˜i and y˜j), the Translation axiom considers that individuals i and
j are equally well-oﬀ.
Characterization of the well-being index
Theorem 1 states the logical implications of imposing that the well-being mea-
sureM(y, L, i) satisﬁes the axioms Pareto Principle, Conditional Priority and
Translation.
Let the equivalent income EI(y, L,i) be deﬁned as follows:
• If yi < y˜i, (yi, Li) ∼i (EI(yi, Li,i), L1);
• If yi = y˜i, EI(yi, Li,i) = y˜i;
• If yi > y˜i, (yi, Li) ∼i (EI(yi, Li,i), L2).
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Note that the equivalent income is not deﬁned for indiﬀerence curves that ev-
erywhere above the thresholds L1, L2.
THEOREM 1 A well-being measure M(y, L,i) satisﬁes the axioms Pareto
Principle, Conditional Priority and Translation if and only if, up to an
increasing transform, it takes the form:
M(y, L,i) = EI(y, L,i)− y˜i
for all (y, L,i) for which EI(y, L,i) is deﬁned.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Theorem 1 states that a well-being measure that satisﬁes the three axioms
presented above - the Pareto Principle, the Conditional Priority axiom and the
Translation axiom - must necessarily take (up to an increasing transform) the
form of the equivalent income net of the critical income making lifetime neutral,
the equivalent income being deﬁned for two particular reference lifetime levels
(one for lives worth living, and one for lives not worth living).
In comparison to the standard equivalent income, the well-being index pro-
posed here diﬀers on two main grounds. First, the reference lifetime level is no
longer unique for all lives, but is speciﬁc to whether the life is worth living or
not. This diﬀerence comes from the Conditional Priority axiom, which deﬁnes
a threshold for lifetime L1 separating lives not worth living that are suﬃciently
short from the ones that are deﬁnitely too long, as well as a second threshold
L2 separating lives worth living that are insuﬃciently long from the ones that
are suﬃciently long. A second diﬀerence lies in the subtraction of the critical
income making lifetime neutral. That second diﬀerence is clearly related to the
Translation axiom. Subtracting the (individual-speciﬁc) critical income mak-
ing lifetime neutral is a way to avoid the counter intuitive result of Figure 1:
individuals with higher equivalents may not necessarily be regarded as better
oﬀ: at the end of the day, what matters is the gap between the equivalent in-
come and the critical income making lifetime neutral. In some sense, material
achievements are here valued not absolutely, but relatively to the conceptions
of a life worth living that individuals have.
With respect to the paradoxical result discussed at the very outset of this
paper, an important property satisﬁed by the new measure of well-being char-
acterized in Theorem 1 is that under this new measure of well-being, a person
who regards his life as not worth living is always regarded as worse-oﬀ than
a person who regards his life as worth living. Thus the measure of well-being
characterized in Theorem 1 is clearly immunized against the problem discussed
at the very outset of this paper. The intuition behind that result is that, under
that well-being index, the equivalent income associated to a life not worth living
is necessarily lower than the critical income making lifetime neutral. Hence, as
a consequence, the well-being measure takes, for lives not worth living, a nega-
tive value, which is necessarily smaller than the values taken by the well-being
index in case of lives worth living (since in that case the well-being index takes
a strictly positive level).
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Note that the characterization result stated in Theorem 1 is not the only
possible way to deal with the problem of well-being measurement when indi-
viduals diﬀer in their conception of the life worth living. In the next section,
we propose to consider an alternative well-being measure, which is still based
on the Pareto Principle and on the Translation axiom, but relies on a modiﬁed
form of the Conditional Priority axiom.
Characterization of an alternative index
This section explores the characterization of an alternative measure of well-
being, which is also an equivalent income net of the critical income level making
lifetime neutral, but that relies on alternative reference lifetime levels, and,
hence, deﬁnes social priority in a diﬀerent manner.
For that purpose, we propose to replace the Conditional Priority axiom by
another axiom, Conditional Priority II, which states that, whatever the level of
lifetime, and whatever individuals are in a life worth living or not worth living,
individuals who care more about longevity are the worst-oﬀ.
Conditional Priority II ∀i, j ∈ N , with y˜i = y˜j = y˜, if Li = Lj = L
and if yi = yj = y ≶ y˜, then if IC(y, L,i) is steeper than IC(y, L,i)
at (y, L), then M(y, L,i) ≥M(y, L,j).
This modiﬁed version of the Conditional Priority axiom states that, at any
point where a single crossing of indiﬀerence curves occurs, the individual who
cares more about lifetime (and thus, whose indiﬀerence curve is less steep in the
(income, lifetime) space), is regarded as the worst-oﬀ, and thus is given social
priority.
The intuition behind that axiom goes as follows. When the life is not worth
living (i.e. yi < y˜i), then lifetime is undesirable, and so it makes sense to
suppose that individuals who care more about their lifetime (to reduce it) are
the worst-oﬀ. Moreover, when life is worth living (i.e. yi > y˜i), then the least
well oﬀ is the individual who cares more about increasing longevity.
In comparison to Conditional Priority, Conditional Priority II assigns social
priority is a quite diﬀerent way, by giving always priority to individuals who are
more concerned with their lifetime. One can regard Conditional Priority II as
specifying that the lifetime threshold L1 deﬁning a life not worth living that is
too long is equal to 0, whereas the threshold L2 deﬁning a life worth living that
is suﬃciently long is here set to the maximum lifetime L. As a consequence,
there remain only two areas in the (income, lifetime) space, separated by the
critical income level making lifetime neutral, and on each side of that threshold
priority is given to individuals who care more about their lifetime. Figure 4
illustrates the Conditional Priority II axiom. The little arrows indicate the
individual who, at a given bundle, is regarded as the worst-oﬀ. Based on that
axiom, the worse-oﬀ is the person who cares more about lifetime (i.e. whose
indiﬀerence curve is less steep at the bundle under study).
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Figure 4: Conditional Priority II
Let us now introduce another axiom, which states that if one changes all
indiﬀerence curves except the one on which the bundle (y, L) lies, this does not
aﬀect the level of measured well-being assigned to that particular bundle.
Independence with respect to irrelevant preferences ∀i, j ∈
N , ∀ (y, L) ∈ R+×R+, if IC (y, L,i) = IC (y, L,j), thenM (y, L,i) =
M (y, L,j).
The Independence with Respect to Irrelevant Preferences is a relatively weak
requirement imposed on the well-being measure.
However, that axiom, when joined with the Pareto Principle, and Continuity,
implies the axiom of Nested Contour Priority (see Fleurbaey and Maniquet
2011).
Nested Contour Priority ∀i, j ∈ N, ∀(y, L), (y′, L′) : int [L(y, L,i) ∩ U(y′, L′,j)] =
Ø, if y˜i = y˜j = y˜,
if y < y′ < y˜ and L > L′, then M(y, L,i) ≤M(y′, L′,j);
if y < y˜ < y′ and L ≷ L′, then M(y, L,i) ≤M(y′, L′,j);
if y˜ < y < y′ and L < L′, then M(y, L,i) ≤M(y′, L′,j).
Note that, since lifetime can be either desirable or undesirable, the deﬁnition of
Nested Contour Priority requires to separate lives worth living from lives not
worth living. When considering lives not worth living, Nested Contour Prior-
ity implies that an individual whose bundle lies on a higher indiﬀerence curve
IC(y, L,i) is (weakly) worse-oﬀ than individuals whose bundles lie on lower
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indiﬀerence curves (in the absence of crossing with IC(y, L,i)). When con-
sidering lives worth living, Nested Contour Priority implies that an individual
whose bundle lies on a lower indiﬀerence curve is (weakly) worse-oﬀ than indi-
viduals whose bundles lie on higher indiﬀerence curves (again in the absence of
crossing).
To prove that the Pareto Principle, jointly with the Independence with Re-
spect to Irrelevant Preferences, implies Nested Contour Priority, we need to
introduce the following Continuity property.
Continuity ∀i ∈ N, ∀(y, L),∀M(y, L,i):
lim→0,ζ→0M(y + ε, L+ ζ,i) =M(y, L,i)
The following lemma states an important intermediate result: any well-being
measure M(y, L,i) that satisﬁes the axioms Pareto Principle and Indepen-
dence with Respect to Irrelevant Preferences satisﬁes also, under Continuity,
Nested Contour Priority.
Lemma 1 A well-being measure M(y, L,i) that satisﬁes the Pareto Princi-
ple, Continuity and Independence with Respect to Irrelevant Preferences
satisﬁes also Nested Contour Priority.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 plays an important role in the characterization of the alternative
well-being index based on Conditional Priority II. Indeed, that lemma allows us
to use Nested Contour Priority to show that individuals with the same income
being at reference lifetime levels have the same well-being levels.
Let the equivalent income ÊI(yi, Li,i) be deﬁned as follows:
• If yi < y˜i, (yi, Li) ∼i (ÊI(yi, Li,i), 0);
• If yi = y˜i, ÊI(yi, Li,i) = y˜i;
• If yi > y˜i, (yi, Li) ∼i (ÊI(yi, Li,i), L).
The following theorem provides the characterization of an alternative measure
of well-being in the context of unequal conceptions of the life worth living.
Contrary to Theorem 1, Theorem 2 relies on Conditional Priority II, which
amounts to give social priority to individuals who care more about their lifetime,
whatever the level of lifetime is, and whatever the life is worth living or not.
THEOREM 2 A well-being measure M(y, L,i) satisﬁes the axioms Pareto
Principle, Independence with Respect to Irrelevant Preferences, Condi-
tional Priority II and Translation if and only if, up to an increasing trans-
form, it takes the form:
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M(y, L,i) = ÊI(y, L,i)− y˜i
for all (y, L,i) for which ÊI(y, L,i) is deﬁned.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The measure of well-being characterized in Theorem 2 shares some structural
similarity with the well-being measure characterized in Theorem 1, in the sense
that both well-being indexes consist of an equivalent income index from which
the critical income making lifetime neutral is subtracted. Hence, that alternative
measure of well-being has also the intuitive property of being immunized against
the somewhat paradoxical result highlighted at the very outset of this paper.
Under the well-being index characterized in Theorem 2, an individual whose life
is not worth living is necessarily ranked as worse-oﬀ than an individual whose
life is worth living.4
However, there is an important diﬀerence between the two well-being in-
dexes. Whereas the well-being measure of Theorem 1 is based on an equivalent
income index under reference lifetimes given by L1 under a life not worth liv-
ing and by L2 under a life worth living, the well-being measure characterized
in Theorem 2 is based on an equivalent income index under reference lifetimes
equal to 0 under a life not worth living, and equal to the maximum lifetime L
under a life worth living.
Those diﬀerences in terms of reference lifetime levels may seem benign, but
these actually make a crucial diﬀerence for interpersonal well-being comparisons.
To see this, take the case of two individuals with lives worth living, individual i
being at (y, L2), whereas individual j is at (y′, L),with y > y′. Assume further
that individuals i and j share the same critical income making lifetime neutral,
and that their associated indiﬀerence curves intersect once for a lifetime level
that lies between L2 and L. Under the well-being measure characterized in The-
orem 1, individual i is regarded as strictly worse oﬀ than individual j, whereas
under the well-being measure of Theorem 2, individual i is regarded as strictly
better oﬀ than individual j. Thus diﬀerences in reference lifetime levels matter
for the measurement and the comparison of well-being across individuals, since
reference lifetime levels incorporate value judgments relative to the social prior-
ity to be given to individuals in various situations. The same kind of well-being
ranking reversals also arises when comparing the well-being levels of individuals
whose life is not worth living.
Concluding remarks
This paper started from a paradoxical result for standard equivalent income in-
dexes in the (income, lifetime) space: when individuals diﬀer in their conception
of a life worth living, it is possible that the equivalent income takes a higher
4Indeed, the well-being index takes a negative value in case of a life not worth living,
against a positive value for a life worth living.
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level for individuals who regard their life as not worth living, in comparison to
its level for individuals who regard their life as worth living. That paradoxi-
cal result comes from the fact that the standard equivalent income abstracts
from an important aspect of individual preferences - their conception of a life
worth living -. As a consequence, standard equivalent incomes could potentially
lead to somewhat counter-intuitive results when making well-being comparisons
between individuals with lives worth living or not worth living.
Starting from that somewhat paradoxical result, this paper proposed to pro-
vide foundations for an alternative equivalent income measure of well-being,
which takes into account individual's conceptions of a life worth living. For
that purpose, we developed a life cycle model with heterogeneous preferences,
including heterogeneous conceptions of a life worth living, and we showed that
simple axioms - the Pareto Principle, Conditional Priority and the Translation
axiom - suﬃce to characterize a new index of well-being: an equivalent income
net of the critical income making lifetime neutral, the equivalent income being
deﬁned for reference lifetime levels that diﬀer depending on whether lives are
worth living or not. We also characterized a variant of that well-being index,
which relies on an alternative version of the Conditional Priority axiom, and,
as a consequence, is based on distinct reference lifetime levels, which lead to
diﬀerent assignments of social priority.
The two new well-being indexes share an intuitive property: these are both
immunized against the counter-intuitive result highlighted at the very outset
of this paper: those well-being indexes always take a lower value for a life not
worth living, in comparison to the measured well-being in case of a life worth
living. Hence, under those well-being indexes, how individuals evaluate whether
their life is worth living or not deﬁnitely matters, and is fully taken into account
when measuring well-being. Since how individuals conceive a life worth living is
a central aspect of their preferences, doing justice to that dimension of individual
preferences contributes to improve the accuracy of well-being indexes.
Quite interestingly, accounting for individual conceptions of a life worth liv-
ing does not only immunize well-being indexes against the paradoxical result
emphasized above. This has also the virtue to provide a more accurate account
of how social priority should be assigned in the context of heterogeneous pref-
erences in the (income, lifetime) space. Actually, distinguishing between lives
worth living and lives not worth living allows us to deﬁne reference lifetime
levels that are conditional on that distinction, and, hence, to provide a more
accurate account of how priorities should be assigned in economies where indi-
viduals diﬀer in income and lifetime. When a life is not worth living, lifetime is
an undesirable good, so that, when lifetime is suﬃciently long, priority should
be given to individuals who care more about their lifetime. On the contrary,
when a life is worth living, lifetime is a desirable good, so that, when lifetime
is not suﬃciently long, priority should also be given to individuals who care
more about their lifetime. Our paper explored two distinct ethical accounts of
what suﬃciently long means in those distinct contexts, and these account are
directly translated into reference lifetime levels that depend on whether lives
are worth living or not, and which have a clear ethical signiﬁcance.
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To conclude, it should be stressed that this paper has implications that go
far beyond the mere measurement of well-being. From a policy perspective,
governments often face diﬃcult trade-oﬀs, between allocating resources among
groups diﬀering in income and in survival conditions. In order to solve those
policy trade-oﬀs, the ﬁrst stage is to assign priority to some groups, and this can
only be done by measuring and comparing the well-being of diﬀerent individuals.
From that perspective, this paper suggests that one could hardly ignore, in that
preliminary stage, how individuals conceive a life worth living.
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Appendix
0.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof proceeds in two steps. We ﬁrst consider the proof of the statement
that a well-being measure satisfying Pareto, Conditional Priority and Transla-
tion takes the form presented in Theorem 1. Then, in the second stage, we will
prove that this measure of well-being satisﬁes indeed the three axioms.
First stage (Sufficiency).
The proof is organized in two stages.
We ﬁrst focus on individuals whose preferences diﬀer, but who have the
same critical income level y˜i . We ﬁrst show that if the indiﬀerence curves of two
distinct individuals cross at the lifetime threshold L1or L2, then the measure of
well-being assigns the same well-being level to those two individuals.
Then, in the second stage, we focus on individuals whose preferences are
such that these do not share the same critical income level y˜
i
.
Consider ﬁrst the case where two individuals i, j enjoy the same bundle
(y, L1).
Suppose that their indiﬀerence curves of i, j intersect only once (single cross-
ing), precisely at that bundle. Moreover, suppose, as on Figure 5, that the in-
diﬀerence curve of i is steeper, at (y, L1), than the indiﬀerence curve of j . We
thus have that, at that bundle, individual i cares less about lifetime, and more
about income, in comparison with individual j.
Then, by the Conditional Priority axiom, we obtain that, given Li = Lj ≥
L1, that the well-being of individual j cannot exceed the well-being than in-
dividual i. However, since Li = Lj ≤ L1, we have also that the well-being of
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Figure 5: Well-being comparisons at L = L1
individual i cannot exceed the well-being than individual j. Hence it follows
that the measured well-being must be equal for individuals i and j.
Consider now the case of no single crossing, that is, the indiﬀerence curves of
individuals i, j intersecting at the bundle (y, L1) also intersect somewhere else
in the space. That case can be dealt with as above. Indeed, in that case, it
is possible to draw another indiﬀerence curve (let us say, for individual k) that
intersects the indiﬀerence curves of i, j at the same bundle, but intersect these
only once. Then, by the argument developed above, we have, given the single
crossing, that individual k is exactly as well-oﬀ as individuals i and j. Hence,
by transitivity of equality, the level of measured well-being must also be equal
for i and j in that case as well.
A similar argument can be developed for the case where indiﬀerence curves
of i, j intersect only once (single crossing) at the bundle (y, L2). In that case,
the same argument holds, and applying the Conditional Priority axiom implies
that the same well-being level must be assigned to individuals i, j.
It follows from this that individuals with distinct preferences but same crit-
ical income can be ranked quite easily, in terms of well-being, whatever their
bundle is. Clearly, for any bundle (yi, Li) on an indiﬀerence curve that crosses
somewhere either the horizontal line at L = L1 in case of a life not worth living,
or that crosses the horizontal line at L = L2 in case of a life worth living, we
know, by the Pareto Principle, that the well-being measured at a bundle (yi, Li)
is necessarily equal to the measured well-being of a hypothetical bundle located
at the threshold lifetime, either L = L1 or L = L2, while remaining on the
same indiﬀerence curve. For all those bundles, the measurement of well-being
can thus be carried out by focusing on the equivalent income associated to the
threshold lifetime L = L1 when the life is not worth living, or to the threshold
L = L2 when life is worth living.
In other words, we have shown so far that individuals who have the same
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equivalent income and the same critical income level have the same level of
well-being. Moreover, provided all individuals share the same critical income
making lifetime neutral, the well-being of all bundles that lie on an indiﬀerence
curve that intersects the thresholds L = L1 or L = L2 can be measured by
the equivalent income associated to one of those reference levels, depending on
whether life is worth living or not.
Note, however, that the proof is not complete yet, since we have focused only
on well-being measurement across individuals sharing the same critical income
level y˜
i
.
When the critical income level is not shared, it is nonetheless possible to
rank individual well-being, by using the Translation axiom.
Take the case of two individuals i, j with diﬀerent preferences i,j , repre-
sented by diﬀerent indiﬀerence maps, including diﬀerent critical income levels.
One can deﬁne a third indiﬀerence map IM(k), which is a translate of the
indiﬀerence map of individual i IM(i) and has the same critical income level
as the one on the indiﬀerence map of individual j, i.e. y˜j . That indiﬀerence map
being a translation of IM(i), we can use the Translation axiom, which states
that any bundle on an indiﬀerence curve of individual i leads to the same well-
being level as the bundles on the corresponding, translated indiﬀerence curve
on IM(k). The Translation axiom allows us to assign a well-being level to all
bundles located along the translated indiﬀerence curves.
But since IM(k) shares the same critical income level as IM(j), one can
use the Conditional Priority axiom to assign also well-being levels to all bundles
along the indiﬀerence curves of IM(j), by using the same arguments as above.
It follows from all this that, thanks to the Translation axiom, the well-being
measure derived above, which can deﬁned conditionally on indiﬀerence maps
having the same critical income level, can be extended to the comparison of
well-being for any indiﬀerence maps, even those that do not share the same
critical income level making lifetime neutral.
Second stage (Necessity).
It is straightforward to show that the measure EI(y, L,i)− y˜i satisﬁes the
Pareto Principle. Indeed, it ranks as equally good bundles that lie on the same
indiﬀerence curve for a given individual. Moreover, it assigns a higher value to
a bundle that lies on a lower indiﬀerence curve in case of a life not worth living,
and a higher value to a bundle that lies on a higher indiﬀerence curve in case of
a life worth living.
One can also show that this index satisﬁes Conditional Priority. To see this,
take the case of two individuals whose indiﬀerence curves cross above L1, and
assume that the indiﬀerence curve of person i is steeper than the one of person
j. When moving along those two indiﬀerence curves in the direction of L1, we
see that the indiﬀerence curve of i will intersect the horizontal line drawn at
L = L1 for a higher level of income, leading to a higher equivalent income, and
a higher measured well-being level than the one of person j. This is clearly in
line with what the Conditional Priority axiom requires.
Concerning the Translation Axiom, it is easy to see that, if two individuals
i, j with translated indiﬀerence maps up to a distance x > 0 have the same
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lifetime, and lie at the same distance of their critical income level, then the
associated measured well-being levels are equal, since the equivalent income
of individual i is equal to the equivalent income of individual j +x. As a
consequence, it follows that EI(yi, Li,i) − y˜i = EI(yj , Lj ,j) + x − y˜i =
EI(yj , Lj ,j) + x − (y˜j + x) = EI(yj , Lj ,j) − y˜j , so that the Translation
axiom is satisﬁed.
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider two individuals i and j who enjoy bundles (y, L) and (y′, L′) respec-
tively. Suppose that y˜ < y < y′, L < L′ and that int [L(y, L,i) ∩ U(y′, L′,j)] =
Ø.
Suppose that the two associated indiﬀerence curves do not intersect, that is,
IC(y, L,i) ∩ IC(y′, L′,j) = Ø.
Then, we can modify individual i's preferences into ′i such that IC(y, L,′i
) = IC(y, L, i) and IC(y′, L′,′i) = IC(y′, L′,j). We know that (y′, L′) ∈
U(y, L,i), therefore, by the Pareto Principle, we have that M(y, L,′i) <
M(y′, L′,′i). Moreover, from Independence with respect to Irrelevant Prefer-
ences, we have that: M(y, L,′i) =M(y, L, i) andM(y′, L′,′i) =M(y′, L′,j
). Hence, by transitivity, we obtain: M(y, L,i) < M(y′, L′,j), which is in
line with Nested Contour Priority.
We thus have proved that the Pareto Principle, jointly with the Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Preferences, implies Nested Contour Priority when the two
indiﬀerence curves associated associated with the two bundles under comparison
do not intersect.
Consider now a second, more complex, case, where the two indiﬀerence
curves IC(y, L,i) and IC(y′, L′,j) do not cross, but nonetheless intersect
in some point. Suppose also that the upper contour set of IC(y, L, i) in-
cludes, as a subset, the upper contour set of IC(y′, L′,j).
Note that, in that case, one cannot use the Independence with respect
to Irrelevant Preferences, since we can no longer modify IC(y′, L′,i) into
IC(y′, L′,j) without reaching a contradiction, since two indiﬀerence curves
of a given individual cannot intersect. However, it is possible to prove that
M(y, L,i) ≤M(y′, L′,j).
We show this by starting from a situation similar to the one considered
above, with y′′ = y′ + ε and L′′ = L′ + ζ. We have, by the same argument
as above, M(y′, L′,j) ≤ M(y′′, L′′,j) and M(y, L,i) ≤ M(y′′, L′′,j),
because indiﬀerence curves do not cross.
Then, consider that the parameters ε and ζ become smaller and smaller. By
the previous reasoning, we still have, for all ε, ζ > 0: M(y, L,i) ≤ M(y′ +
ε, L′ + ζ,j). This implies, thanks to Continuity, that limε→0,ζ→0M(y′ +
ε, L′ + ζ,j) = M(y′, L′,j) ≥ M(y, L,i). Indeed, if one had M(y′, L′,j
) < M(y, L,i), there would be ε, ζ small enough such that M(y′ + ε, L′ +
ζ,j) < M(y, L,i). This would contradict the fact that for all ε, ζ > 0:
M(y, L,i) ≤M(y′ + ε, L′ + ζ,j).
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A similar proof can be made when considering both lives not worth living.
Note that, when comparing a life worth living with a life not worth living, the
two associated indiﬀerence curves cannot intersect, so that only the ﬁrst part of
the proof is needed in that case.
Proof of Theorem 2
The proof proceeds in two steps. Using Lemma 1, we ﬁrst consider the proof
of the statement that a well-being measure satisfying Pareto Principle, Nested
Contour Priority, Conditional Priority II and Translation takes the form pre-
sented in Theorem 2. Then, in the second stage, we will prove that this measure
of well-being satisﬁes indeed the four axioms.
First stage (Sufficiency).
The proof is organized in two stages.
We ﬁrst focus on individuals whose preferences diﬀer, but who have the same
critical income level y˜
i
= y˜j = y˜. We ﬁrst show that if the indiﬀerence curves of
two distinct individuals cross at the lifetime threshold 0 or L, then the measure
of well-being assigns the same well-being level to those two individuals.
Consider ﬁrst the case where individuals have the same bundle (y, 0) with
y < y˜. Suppose that the indiﬀerence curve of i is steeper, at (y, 0), than
the indiﬀerence curve of j . We thus have that, at that bundle, individ-
ual i cares less about lifetime, and more about income, in comparison with
individual j. By Conditional Priority II, we know that individual i cannot
be strictly worse oﬀ than individual j, that is: M(y, 0,i) ≥ M(y, 0,j).
But notice that the indiﬀerence curve of i lies above the indiﬀerence curve
of j in the (income, lifetime) space. Hence, by Nested Contour Priority, we
have that individual i cannot be strictly better oﬀ than individual j, that is,
M(y, 0,i) ≤ M(y, 0,j). Hence, given M(y, 0,i) ≥ M(y, 0,j) (by Condi-
tional Priority II) and M(y, 0,i) ≤M(y, 0,j) (by Nested Contour Priority),
it follows that: M(y, 0,i) =M(y, 0,j).
Note that, whereas the Conditional Priority II axiom presupposed single
crossing of indiﬀerence curves, one can extend the above results to the case
where indiﬀerence curves meeting at the bundle (y, 0) intersect more than once.
To see this, take three indiﬀerence curves, denoted 1, 2, 3, that intersect only at
(y, 0) with the indiﬀerence curve 1 being above the indiﬀerence curve 2, which
is itself above the indiﬀerence curve 3. Then draw another indiﬀerence curve,
called c, which also passes through (y, 0), but intersect indiﬀerence curve 2 also
at another point, but without intersecting indiﬀerence curves 1 and 3 except
at (y, 0). By Nested Contour Priority, we have that M(y, 0,1) ≤ M(y, 0,c
) ≤ M(y, 0,3). But by the argument developed in case of single-crossing
(combination of Nested Contour Priority and Conditional Priority II), we have
also that: M(y, 0,1) = M(y, 0,3). Moreover, by Nested Contour Priority,
we have also: M(y, 0,1) ≤ M(y, 0,2) ≤ M(y, 0,3). Hence it follows that:
M(y, 0,1) = M(y, 0,2) = M(y, 0,3). As a consequence, we obtain that:
M(y, 0,2) =M(y, 0,c).
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Hence the above argument can be extended to cases where indiﬀerence curves
meeting at (y, 0) intersect more than once.
A similar argument can be developed for the case where indiﬀerence curves
of i, j intersect only once (single crossing) at the bundle (y, L). In that case,
the same argument holds, and applying the Conditional Priority II axiom with
Nested Contour Priority implies that the same well-being level must be assigned
to individuals i, j.
It follows from this that individuals with distinct preferences but same crit-
ical income can be ranked quite easily, in terms of well-being, whatever their
bundle is. Clearly, for any bundle (yi, Li) on an indiﬀerence curve that crosses
somewhere either the horizontal line at L = 0 in case of a life not worth liv-
ing, or that crosses the horizontal line at L = L in case of a life worth living,
we know, by the Pareto Principle, that the well-being measured at a bundle
(yi, Li) is necessarily equal to the measured well-being of a hypothetical bundle
located at the threshold lifetime, either L = 0 or L = L, while remaining on the
same indiﬀerence curve. For all those bundles, the measurement of well-being
can thus be carried out by focusing on the equivalent income associated to the
threshold lifetime L = 0 when the life is not worth living, or to the threshold
L = L when life is worth living.
In other words, we have shown that individuals who have the same equiva-
lent income and the same critical income level have the same level of well-being.
Moreover, provided all individuals share the same critical income making life-
time neutral, the well-being of all bundles that lie on an indiﬀerence curve that
intersects the thresholds L = 0 or L = L can be measured by the equivalent
income associated to one of those reference levels, depending on whether life is
worth living or not.
Note, however, that the proof is not complete yet, since we have focused only
on well-being measurement across individuals sharing the same critical income
level y˜
i
.
When the critical income level is not shared, it is nonetheless possible to
rank individual well-being, by using the Translation axiom.
Take the case of two individuals i, j with diﬀerent preferences i,j , repre-
sented by diﬀerent indiﬀerence maps, including diﬀerent critical income levels.
One can deﬁne a third indiﬀerence map IM(k), which is a translate of the
indiﬀerence map of individual i IM(i) and has the same critical income level
as the one on the indiﬀerence map of individual j, i.e. y˜j . That indiﬀerence map
being a translation of IM(i), we can use the Translation axiom, which states
that any bundle on an indiﬀerence curve of individual i leads to the same well-
being level as the bundles on the corresponding, translated indiﬀerence curve
on IM(k). The Translation axiom allows us to assign a well-being level to all
bundles located along the translated indiﬀerence curves.
But since IM(k) shares the same critical income level as IM(j), one
can use the Conditional Priority II axiom to assign also well-being levels to all
bundles along the indiﬀerence curves of IM(j), by using the same arguments
as above.
It follows from all this that, thanks to the Translation axiom, the well-being
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measure derived above, which can deﬁned conditionally on indiﬀerence maps
having the same critical income level, can be extended to the comparison of
well-being for any indiﬀerence maps, even those that do not share the same
critical income level making lifetime neutral.
Second stage (Necessity).
It is straightforward to show that the measure ÊI(y, L,i)− y˜i satisﬁes the
Pareto Principle. Indeed, it ranks as equally good bundles that lie on the same
indiﬀerence curve for a given individual. Moreover, it assigns a higher value to
a bundle that lies on a lower indiﬀerence curve in case of a life not worth living,
and a higher value to a bundle that lies on a higher indiﬀerence curve in case of
a life worth living.
One can also show that this index satisﬁes Conditional Priority II. To see
this, take the case of two individuals whose indiﬀerence curves cross above L = 0,
and assume that the indiﬀerence curve of person i is steeper than the one of
person j. When moving along those two indiﬀerence curves in the direction
of L = 0, we see that the indiﬀerence curve of i will intersect the horizontal
line drawn at L = 0 for a higher level of income, leading to a higher equivalent
income, and a higher measured well-being level than the one of person j. This
is clearly in line with what the Conditional Priority II axiom requires.
Concerning the Translation Axiom, it is easy to see that, if two individu-
als i, j with translated indiﬀerence maps up to a distance x > 0 have the same
lifetime, and lie at the same distance of their critical income level, then the asso-
ciated well-being measured are equal, since the equivalent income of individual i
is equal to the equivalent income of individual j +x. As a consequence, it follows
that ÊI(yi, Li,i)−y˜i = ÊI(yj , Lj ,j)+x−y˜i = ÊI(yj , Lj , j)+x−(y˜j+x) =
ÊI(yj , Lj ,j)− y˜j , so that the Translation axiom is satisﬁed.
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